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i. introduction
“Dysfunctional” is the adjective ascribed to the New York State Legislature by two reports issued by the Bren-
nan Center for Justice: The New York State Legislative Process: An Evaluation and Blueprint for Reform released 
in 2004 and the follow up, Unfinished Business: New York State Legislative Reform 2006 Update.
The legislative leadership largely dismissed the findings of the 2004 report. Assembly Speaker Sheldon Sil-
ver told the New York Times, “Nothing happens here in Albany, in the Assembly, without the input of the 
rank-and-file legislators.”1 Joe Bruno, who recently left the Senate after serving for 14 years as its Majority 
Leader, called the report “pure nonsense” and equated a more democratic process with that of a Third World 
country.2
Yet when the Legislature came back into session in early 2005, the Leaders announced rules changes—the 
first time in a generation—accompanied by self-congratulatory fanfare. 3  In press releases that described the 
reforms’ aspirational effect on the Legislature, the Assembly Speaker and Senate Majority Leader claimed that 
the new rules would usher in an era of openness, effectiveness, and accountability. The Senate even went so 
far as to claim that it addressed most of the recommendations made by the Brennan Center.4 
Unfinished Business: New York State Legislative Reform 2006 Update concluded that the changes on the whole, 
while a good start, were by no means transformative. The Legislature failed to adopt a comprehensive set 
of new rules that incorporated the Brennan Center’s recommendations for making the legislative process 
more robust and democratic. Of the changes that the legislature did adopt, some, quite cynically, codified 
the status quo in new ways. The continued presence of these rules stifles rigorous deliberation and debate 
and hobbles the sincere efforts of a number of rank-and-file legislators to represent the best interests of their 
constituents and the state as a whole.
In 2006 and 2007, most standing committees met infrequently or not at all. There were almost no hearings 
on major legislation. Not a single major bill was the subject of a detailed committee report.  Leadership 
maintained near total control over what bills reached the floor.  And on the floor, there was little substantive 
debate; every bill brought to the floor for a vote in either chamber passed.
The good news is that, for the first time in years, there is reason to hope that at least one chamber will begin 
to make the structural changes that could remake the legislature. Come January, majority control of the Sen-
ate may shift to the Democrats.5 In 2007, likely incoming Senate President Pro Tempore Malcolm Smith 
introduced new rules in line with our previous recommendations (the one-house resolution failed along a 
party-line vote). During a Reform Day New York panel last year, Senator Smith reaffirmed his commitment 
to introducing the same package of rules reform “without question” 6 if the Democrats regained the majority. 
He previously stated, “We cannot truly reform the legislative process in Albany until we have successfully 
reformed the rules that govern the Legislature.” 7 More recently, Senator Smith told the New York Times 
that the under his leadership, the Senate “would be more transparent, more participatory.” Smith reaffirmed 
that rules reform under a Democratic majority would include broader latitude for members to put bills on 
committee agendas or vote them out of committee and onto the floor, abolishment of secretive canvass of 
agreement votes and restrictions on discharge motions, and the enactment of new rules requiring committee 
members to be physically present to vote.8
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At a time when state revenues are shrinking—Governor Paterson forecast a $47 billion budget deficit over 
the next four years9—it has become all the more important for the legislature to be more creative and effec-
tive. The rules changes we recommend are a step toward this goal.  
At the opening of 2009 session, both houses will once again have the opportunity to modify their rules. We 
urge the new Senate Majority to honor its commitment to genuine rules reform. The Assembly, which retains 
a super-majority in favor of the Democrats, should follow suit. 
While the world of legislative rules may seem arcane, our capitol’s dysfunction has received unprecedented 
attention over the period covered in this report thanks in part to the failure of New York City’s congestion 
pricing proposal. For far too long, the leadership has failed to enact the changes necessary to remake the Sen-
ate and Assembly. Today, pressure to change the culture of Albany may have finally intersected with a new 
opportunity for reform. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The quantitative analysis of the Legislature’s performance in 2006 and 2007 and qualitative information 
from interviews with lawmakers reveal that the problems outlined in the original report still plague both 
chambers. Our analysis of the legislature’s performance in 2006 and 2007 shows that the vast majority of 
problems identified in our previous two reports remain endemic in both chambers:
•	 In	both	chambers,	but	especially	in	the	Assembly,	leadership	maintained	a	stranglehold	on	the	
flow of legislation at all stages of the legislative process.
•	 Committee	meetings	were	 infrequent	 in	both	 chambers	 and	 sparsely	 attended	 in	 the	 Senate,	
where members can vote without being physically present.
•	 Most	standing	committees	in	both	chambers	failed	to	hold	any	hearings	on	major	legislation.
•	 There	were	no	detailed	committee	reports	attached	to	major	bills	in	the	Senate,	and	the	Assembly	
rules do not require substantive reports to accompany bills reported out of committee.
•	 Legislators	introduced	an	extraordinary	number	of	bills	in	both	houses	during	each	session,	while	
only a small percentage received a floor vote.
•	 100%	of	the	bills	that	leadership	allowed	to	reach	the	floor	of	either	chamber	for	a	vote	passed	
with almost no debate.
•	 Senate	records	indicate	that	many	of	the	bills	that	received	a	floor	vote	lacked	critical	and	required	
information about their fiscal impact, usually passing the full chamber without any meaningful 
debate or dissent.
•	 The	use	of	conference	committees	to	reconcile	similar	bills	in	each	chamber	remained	the	exceed-
ingly rare exception, rather than the rule.
Brennan Center for Justice | 3
•	 Member	resources	were	distributed	inequitably	in	both	chambers	on	the	basis	of	party,	loyalty	
and seniority. 
•	 Much	of	the	legislative	process	remains	opaque;	records	are	difficult	to	obtain	without	burden-
some “freedom of information” requests, and key records of deliberation—such as “no” votes on 
procedural motions in the Senate—are not maintained. 
It is plain from this and other evidence explored in our latest update that New York’s legislative process 
remains broken. In January 2009, each chamber will again have the opportunity to change their operating 
rules and begin to fix this process.  Such changes will not require agreement between the chambers or guber-
natorial approval.  At a minimum, they should meet the following five objectives:
1. Strengthen standing committees so that debate is robust and rank-and-file members can 
force a hearing or a vote, even over the objections of the committee chair (Discussed in 
greater detail on pages 4–12).
2. End the leadership stranglehold on bills coming to the floor (Discussed in greater detail on 
pages 12–16).
3. Allow ample opportunity for adequate review of all bills (Discussed in greater detail on 
pages 17–23).
4. Provide all members with sufficient resources and opportunities to fully consider legislation 
(Discussed in greater detail on pages 24–26).
5. With respect to all of the above, make records of the legislative process transparent and easily 
accessible to the public via the Internet (Discussed in greater detail throughout this report). 
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ii. dysfunctional standing committees
In many state legislatures and in the United States Congress, committees function as the locus of legislative 
activity.10 In New York, they do not. The Speaker of the Assembly and Senate Majority Leader maintain 
complete control over the committee process, rendering committees unable to fulfill a primary legislative 
purpose. 
In truth, most standing committees in Albany exist only as a formality; they serve merely as a place to intro-
duce legislation, not as a place to consider, debate, and remake legislation. The leadership prevents legislation 
with which they do not agree from ever achieving momentum through exploration in committee, limiting 
the need to apply the breaks on legislation that has gained force later in the process.
Ideally, committees should work as follows: a lawmaker identifies an issue and writes legislation in response. 
Once introduced, the draft bill subject to public hearings and debate in committee. Before legislation reaches 
the floor, lawmakers explore its merits and shortcomings by hearing expert criticism from committee mem-
bers and the public and make any necessary revisions.11  In many state legislatures and in Congress, the full 
chamber can vote to override a bill’s referral to a particular committee; in many state legislatures, committees 
are required or must honor requests to hold a hearing on every bill.12 This is not the case in Albany—almost 
all aspects of this ideal process are inadequate or lacking in the New York State Legislature.
The shortcomings of standing committees in New York include:
•	 Leadership	control	over	committee	staff	prevents	independent	committee	decision	making.
•	 Committee	meetings	are	infrequent	or	nonexistent.
•	 Rank-and-file	legislators	in	both	chambers	lack	the	power	to	compel	a	hearing	on	legislation	or	
oversight within a committee’s jurisdiction. 
•	 In	 the	 Senate,	 committee	members	 can	 vote	 absentee	 by	 signed	 agenda,	 leading	 to	 sparsely	
attended or nonexistent meetings with no opportunity for debate.
•	 Committees	in	both	chambers	do	not	draft	meaningful	reports	that	explain	the	purpose	or	intent	
of a bill, and rarely publish annual reports of their work as required by the rules. 
•	 Committee	work	in	both	chambers	is	opaque,	with	little	opportunity	for	public	oversight	of	the	
foundational work of policymaking.
To address these problems, we propose the following rules changes:
•	 Standing	committee	 chairs	 should	have	exclusive	authority	 and	 responsibility	 to	hire	 and	fire	
their staff and control committee budgets. 
•	 At least one-fourth of the membership of a committee should be able to vote to convene a meeting.
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•	 One	fourth	of	the	members	of	a	committee	should	be	able	to	petition	for	a	hearing	on	a	bill	or	an	
oversight hearing, and such hearing will be held unless rejected by a majority vote of the commit-
tee. All “yes,” “no,” “abstain,” or “absent” votes should be recorded and made available to the public. 
•	 Each	committee	and	sub-committee	must	hold	an	oversight	hearing	on	at	least	one	program	or	
state agency within its jurisdiction at least once per year.
•	 No	member’s	vote	on	any	matter	before	committee	will	be	counted	unless	the	member	is	physi-
cally present to cast her vote.
•	 All	bills	reported	to	the	floor	in	both	chambers	must	be	accompanied	by	a	substantive	committee	
report showing the committee’s work on the bill.
•	 Each	committee	and	subcommittee	in	both	houses	should	submit	an	annual	end-of-term	report	
to the Speaker in the Assembly and Majority Leader in the Senate, detailing the work of the com-
mittee, as the Assembly rules currently require.
•	 All	attendance	records,	meeting	agendas,	committee	votes,	and	minutes	of	committee	meetings	
will be recorded and made available to the public on the Internet at least once a month.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMITTEE PERFORMANCE 
The original 2004 Report used several criteria to determine the robustness of the committee process and the 
many “steps of life of a bill.” The 2006 report identified no significant improvement and occasional decline 
on each criterion in the two years after the publication of the first report. Those criteria, which include fre-
quency of meetings, absentee or proxy voting, unanimous votes, and committee reports, once again showed 
only marginal improvement, stasis, or decline in 2006 and 2007. 
problem: Leadership Control Over Committee Staff
As discussed in our previous reports, the Speaker of the Assembly controls all committee personnel, known 
as “Central Staff.” This control limits deliberative opportunity in the legislative process by depriving com-
mittee chairs of the capacity to explore pressing issues or develop legislation without the approval of the 
leadership.13
 solution:
Standing committee chairs should have exclusive authority and responsibility to hire and fire their own staff 
and control committee budgets.
problem: Infrequent Committee Meetings
As described in our previous report, Senate committee meetings in 2005 were rare: 15 of 31 committees met 
five or fewer times.14 In recent years, Senate committees met even less frequently. This problem is measur-
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ably worse than in the Assembly, where committees meet somewhat more frequently and members must be 
physically present to vote. 
In 2006, a majority of Senate committees (18 of the 31) met two or fewer times to consider major legislation. 
In considering major bills, only five committees met monthly on average, and four committees (Cities, Eth-
ics, Racing and Gaming, and Tourism) didn’t meet at all. In 2007, 14 of 31 Senate committees met two or 
fewer times to consider major legislation. Five committees (Commerce, Corporations, Energy and Telecom-
munications, Insurance, and Ethics) didn’t hold any meetings on major bills. 
The Senate Ethics Committee, which was noted in the 2006 Report for not meeting at all in 2005 or 200615, 
still hasn’t held a meeting—on major legislation or otherwise—during the period covered in this report and 
in 2008.16 In fact, the Senate’s ethics committee has not met in over a decade, while the Assembly’s commit-
tee has met infrequently over that same period. Despite this fact, the two ethics committee chairs each earn 
an extra $12,500 annually for their titles.17  
Under the Senate rules, the existence of a record of a meeting does not necessarily indicate that committee 
members convened, but rather that members submitted votes on legislation under consideration. Interviews 
with Senators suggest that attendance at committee meetings is usually sparse and commonly includes only 
the chair and the ranking member.18 One Senate committee chair questioned a member of the minority at 
the opening of a scheduled meeting, asking, “Why are you here? You’re creating work for me.”19 
solution:
At least one-fourth of the membership of a committee should be able to vote to convene a meeting.
problem: Inadequate Oversight Hearings
In 2005, the Assembly moved in the direction of adopting one of the Brennan Center’s recommendations to 
require annual oversight hearings by committees to assess the relevant agency’s implementation of programs:
Each standing committee shall, furthermore, devote substantial efforts to the oversight and analysis of the 
activities, including but not limited to the implementation and administration of programs, of departments, 
agencies, divisions, authorities, boards, commissions, public benefit corporations and other entities within 
its jurisdiction. 20
 
With this new rule the Assembly appears to acknowledge the importance of oversight. Unfortunately, it still 
sometimes falls short. The Assembly Oversight and Analysis Committee, with a very specific mandate, has 
not held a meeting of its members in years21  and recently held its first hearing in 18 months.22  Even while 
ignoring this explicit duty, the Oversight Committee Chairs collected a stipend of $12,500 annually.23 
But there has been some progress. Assembly committees have begun to hold annual budget implementation 
hearings.24 For this, the Assembly deserves some credit. However, there is still room for improvement to 
ensure that sessions are well attended and not perfunctory.
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The Senate has no rule similar to the Assembly’s acknowledging the responsibility of com-
mittees to hold oversight hearings.  Not surprisingly, the Senate has also failed to hold 
many oversight hearings. In fact, over the past three years, the only oversight pursued by 
the Senate Committee on Investigations and Government Operations—which has over-
lapping oversight jurisdiction in the Senate—was the so-called “Troopergate” scandal. The 
Senate Investigations Committee held several hearings devoted to uncovering facts around 
Troopergate, which came to light in the summer of 2007.25
 
solutions:
One fourth of the members of a committee should be able to petition for a hearing on a 
bill or an oversight hearing, and such hearing will be held unless rejected by a majority vote 
of the committee. All “yes,” “no,” “abstain,” or “absent” votes should be recorded and made 
available to the public. 
Each committee and sub-committee must hold an oversight hearing on at least one pro-
gram or state agency within its jurisdiction at least once per year.
case study I: oversight nowhere in sight—hava compliance
One prominent example of oversight failure involves New York’s noncompliance with the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002. That federal law required, among other things, that all 
voting systems in the state produce a permanent paper record that can be audited dur-
ing a recount; that each polling site have at least one voting machine that is accessible to 
individuals with disabilities; and that the state construct a statewide computerized voter 
registration list. New York is the last state in the nation to upgrade from its decades-old 
mechanical lever voting machines and the state is the farthest behind in HAVA compliance. 
Significant federal aid is at stake—about $230 million towards new voting technology 
remains unspent.26 
New York’s violation of HAVA was so egregious that in 2006, the U.S. Department of 
Justice filed suit against the state. Today, New York’s compliance with many of the require-
ments of HAVA, including new voting machines that require a paper trail, is still up in the 
air.  The situation was so bad that one point last year the federal judge overseeing the case 
even threatened to jail state Board of Elections officials for non-compliance.27  “Why is it that 
New York thinks it can thumb its nose at the federal government?” the judge asked in court.28 
While the federal lawsuit came to a head in the end of 2007 and in the first few months 
of 2008, decisions about our new voting system continue to evolve at a glacial pace. The 
Board of Elections continues to push deadlines to introduce new voting machines further 
into the future. A status report issued by the Board of Elections in July stated that it might 
not meet the latest court-imposed deadline, stating, “Overall, activities and progress toward 
HAVA compliance are in jeopardy per the project timeline.”29  More recently, the company 
contracted by the state Board of Elections to test the new voting system lost its federal cer-
tification,30  rendering compliance with the court-ordered September 2009 deadline for the 
implementation of new machines even less likely.
MAR. 1
DoJ files suit 
against NYS.
JUN. 2 
Agreement reached 
between NYS and 
DoJ: new voting
machines by Sep. ’07.
DEC. 18
State Board of Elec-
tions (SBoE) will 
miss machine testing 
deadline; no new 
machines by Sep. ’07.
JAN. 4
NY Times reveals 
Feds decertified 
tester of voting ma-
chines contracted 
by state.
OCT. 3
SBoE then asks for 
an extension: the 
’09 elections. 
NOV. 5
DoJ says SBoE 
violated court’s Sep. 
’07  deadline for new 
machines.
 
DEC. 20
Court agrees to dis-
abled voter-accessible 
machines for Sep. ’08 
primaries, all other 
HAVA compliance 
by ’09.
2007 
2006
2008
FEB. 19
Counties choose 
new voter-accessible 
machines.
JUL. 25
SBoE tells court 
they will miss ’09 
deadline for new vot-
ing machines.
OCT. 29
Feds decertify sec-
ond tester of voting 
machines contract-
ed by state. 
ny state hava 
non-compliance
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At least four committees in the state legislature have jurisdiction over election issues, most directly the Elec-
tion Law Committee in the Assembly and Elections Committee in the Senate, in addition to the oversight 
committees in both houses.  These four committees have been silent on the state’s failure to comply with 
federal election law. None of these committees held a single hearing or public meeting devoted to formulat-
ing a plan to move forward on HAVA compliance or to investigate compliance delays.31
By contrast, the New York City Council has held a number of hearings related to the State Board’s failure to 
comply with HAVA.  Douglas Kellner, co-chair of the state Board of Elections, Assemblyman Keith Wright, 
then-Chair of the Assembly Election Law Committee, and state Senator Liz Kruger have offered testimony 
about HAVA compliance at hearings before the New York City Council Government Operations Commit-
tee.32  The Committee, chaired by Councilman Simcha Fleder, has regularly scrutinized voting and elections 
in the period covered in this Report.33 
 
problem: Absentee Voting by Signed Agenda
In the 2006 Update, we noted that the Senate changed the language in its rules that allowed proxy voting—
without adding an explicit ban on absentee voting.
Under the current Senate rules, proxy voting has given way to “voting by signed agenda,” which allows Sena-
tors to vote when not present.34 The result of signed-agenda voting is institutionalized absentee voting and 
increased opacity of attendance records. Senate committee records for meetings concerning major legislation 
in	2006	show	97.2%	total	attendance	for	86	committee	meetings	with	a	single	unexcused	absence	and	37	
excused absences. In 2007, Senate records for committee meetings concerning major legislation indicate 
97.9%	total	attendance	of	100	meetings	with	one	unexcused	absence	and	32	excused	absences.		These	arti-
ficially high numbers only show the total number of votes cast in committee, without giving any indication 
of meeting attendance. 
Rules of the Senate
(2003–2004)
Rule VII §5. Reports. a. No committee shall 
vote to report a bill or other matter unless a 
majority of all the members thereof vote in 
favor of such report. Each report of a com-
mittee upon a bill shall have the vote of each 
Senator attached thereto and such report and 
vote shall be available for public inspection. A 
member’s vote on any matter before the com-
mittee may be by proxy. Such a proxy vote 
shall be made by the member specifying the 
member’s vote on a signed committee agenda 
delivered to the Committee Chair.
Rules of the Senate 
 (Current)
Rule VII §5. Reports. a. No committee shall 
vote to report a bill or other matter unless a 
majority of all  the  members  thereof   vote  
in  favor  of  such report. Each report of a 
committee  upon a bill shall have the vote  of  
each  Senator  attached  thereto  and  such  
report  and  vote shall be available for  public 
inspection. A member’s vote on any matter 
before  the  committee  shall  be  entered  by  
the  member on a signed official voting sheet 
delivered to the Committee Chair.
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The Assembly rules do not allow proxy voting in that chamber; committee chairs use roll call sheets to mark 
how members voted and whether members are absent or excused. According to one member of the Assembly, 
committee meetings “typically, won’t start until everybody is there or accounted for” 35 and are well attended.
 
Assembly Codes Committee Voting Sheet with Attendance
Senate Banks Committee Member Voting Sheet
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solution:
No member’s vote on any matter before committee will be counted unless the member is physically present 
to cast her vote.
problem: Lack of Dissent in Committee
The large number of unanimous votes on bills over the past decade is evidence of the role of committee chairs 
in enacting the will of the leadership.  Between 1998 and 2001, major legislation passed committee by a 
unanimous	vote	an	average	of	90%	of	the	time	in	the	Senate.		In	2005,	89.8%	(i.e.,	184	of	205)	committee	
votes were unanimous.  
Little	has	changed	in	the	Senate.	In	2006,	of	195	committee	votes	on	major	legislation,	171	(i.e.,	87.6%)	
were	unanimous.	In	2007,	220	of	242	(i.e.,	90.9%)	committee	votes	on	major	legislation	were	unanimous.	
In 2006, the greatest number of “no” votes recorded on a single major bill in committee was 3 votes against 
authorizing physical therapy treatment without referral in certain cases. In 2007, a handful of major bills 
received 4 and 5 “no” votes in the committee of original jurisdiction followed by 7 “no” votes in the Rules 
Committee. 
The total number of “no” votes cast in the Senate remains paltry following 2005 when only 25 “no” votes 
were cast out of 5,650 votes cast in committee on major legislation. In 2006, of the 3,377 votes cast in com-
mittee on major legislation, only 22 were against the legislation, and 14 out of 17 non-unanimous votes in 
2006 received only a single “no” vote. In 2007, just 61 “no” votes cast out of 4,471 total committee votes cast 
on major legislation, and of the 20 non-unanimous votes, 9 received only one dissenting vote. 
In	the	Assembly,	the	number	of	unanimous	committee	votes	on	major	legislation	averaged	83%	from	1997	
to	2001.	In	2005,	90.4%	of	major	bills	received	unanimous	committee	votes.	Unanimity	in	the	Assembly	
remained high in 2006, but saw some improvement in 2007.  Of the 381 committee votes on major legisla-
tion	in	2006,	344	were	unanimous,	(i.e.,	90.2%).	In	2007,	219	of	266	committee	votes	on	major	legislation	
(i.e.,	82.3%)	were	unanimous.	
Despite this improvement, the number of “no” votes in Assembly committees amounted to just 76 out of 
8,457 total cast in committee on major legislation in 2006 and 144 out of 5,611 votes cast in committee on 
major legislation in 2007. These numbers reflect little improvement over the total “no” votes reported for 
2005, when 100 out of 5,677 total committee votes cast on major legislation were dissenting. The intensity 
of dissent remains low in the Assembly; about two thirds of non-unanimous committee votes on major 
legislation in 2006 and two fifths of non-unanimous committee votes on major legislation in 2007 received 
only one “no” vote. 
solution:
No single rule would cure the problem of lack of dissent. However, if leadership had less than total control 
over the ultimate fate of every bill, committee deliberation and debate would be more meaningful and more 
substantive, and dissent would likely follow. 
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problem: Insubstantial Committee Reports
Committee reports on legislation should serve as guidance for courts, on which they rely, for the full chamber 
and the public.36 However, in 2005, the Senate and Assembly did not issue a single substantive committee 
report on 317 pieces of major legislation signed into law,37 nor did they issue any substantive committee 
reports on major legislation in 2006 or 2007. While the Senate instituted a new rule in 2005 to require such 
reports, 38  the practical result is simply a list of bills with information that is available elsewhere, such as the 
bill summary, committee vote on the bill, and whether or not a fiscal note was attached. The Assembly, whose 
rules do not explicitly require substantive reports reflecting the work of the committee, does not appear to 
have produced a substantive committee report since 2003 when it issued two, one for a state “no call registry” 
and another for a study of a striped bass fishery in the Hudson River.39
solution:
All bills reported to the floor in either chamber must be accompanied by a substantive committee report 
showing the committee’s work on the bill
Each committee and subcommittee in both houses should submit an annual end-of-term report to the 
Speaker in the Assembly and Majority Leader in the Senate, detailing the work of the committee, as the As-
sembly rules currently require.
problem: Committee Work is Opaque
Well into the Information Age, it remains difficult for the average citizen to discern the work of standing 
committees from what is currently available on the web sites of the Assembly and the Senate. The sites are 
poorly organized and contain few products of the lawmaking process. The Assembly posts and retains a bit 
more information about committees than the Senate, including notices of public hearings and sporadic 
reports. 
Committees should publish all of their work on the Internet, including hearing transcripts, attendance 
records, vote records, and debate transcripts. California and Connecticut are good models for legislative 
operating transparency. California’s web site includes daily journals of floor proceedings, legislative counsel 
analysis of all pending legislation, committee analysis, committee and floor voting records, and audio and 
video of floor proceedings. Connecticut’s site includes a weekly record of all committee action taken on legis-
lation under consideration, all fiscal notes, archived public hearing bulletins, committee minutes, committee 
reports, committee agendas, floor and committee vote tally sheets, and streaming audio and video of pro-
ceedings. This does not require extraordinary resources—Connecticut, which leads the nation in transpar-
ency and accessibility of records, employs ten clerical staff (three of whom are sessional) in each chamber.
solution:
All attendance, meetings, votes and minutes of committee meetings in both chambers should be recorded 
and made available to the public on the Internet at least once a month.
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iii. leadership control as a barrier to full
 consideration of legislation
In the 2004 and 2006 reports, we noted how difficult it is for legislators to move bills to the floor without 
the support of the Speaker or Majority Leader.  As the 2004 report notes, the barriers to getting a bill from 
committee to consideration before the full chamber are greater than in any other state.41 
This task of moving a bill from committee to a floor vote remains as difficult as ever for rank-and-file mem-
bers. In the Assembly, chairs of the Ways and Means and Codes committees have broad latitude to request 
bills outside their jurisdiction. The joke inside the Assembly chamber is that Codes is where bills go to die.42 
The 2004 report identified three key barriers to full consideration: legislative leaders’ full control over the 
order of bills on the calendar and whether a bill is placed on the calendar at all; restrictions on motions to 
discharge a bill from committee to the floor; and the Senate Majority Leader’s ability to “star” a matter and 
prevent action until date of his choosing. 
the legislative retrieval serviCe
According to state law, legislative records are available to the public through a request for informa-
tion under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), which reads in part: “The people’s right to 
know the process of governmental decision-making and to review the documents and statistics 
leading to determinations is basic to our society. Access to such information should not be thwarted 
by shrouding it with the cloak of secrecy or confidentiality.”40
Given the extremely limited nature of the Senate and Assembly Web sites, FOIL requests, many of 
which we submitted in the course of researching this report, are necessary in order to fully assess the 
performance of the Legislature. FOIL requests, which can take weeks to bear results, are the only 
way to ascertain information on committee votes, transcripts of debate, attendance, fiscal notes, 
and records crucial to understanding the legislative process.
There is another option if FOIL requests are inconvenient: the Legislative Retrieval Service (LRS). 
An online service founded in 1984 by the bipartisan Legislative Bill Drafting Commission, a sub-
scription to the LRS costs $2,250 annually.
“The only people who can afford it are primarily lobbyists,” said Susan Lerner, Executive Director 
of Common Cause/New York. “Every state that has a good legislative Web site provides informa-
tion in real time at no cost. This is public information prepared by public employees with public 
resources and it is now only available to private subscribers. It should be readily available to the public.”
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The 2004 Report noted that about one half of the country’s 99 legislative chambers had a deadline for action 
on all bills referred to them.43 The New York Senate’s 30-day waiting period before a discharge motion can be 
made—reduced from 60 days in 2005—was exceptional among state legislatures. Only five other chambers 
required a waiting period of more than 21 days.44 
While “starring” is no longer permissible in its previous form, these essential barriers to consideration remain, 
encompassing a larger number of specific problems:
•	 Leadership	control	over	the	administration	of	bill	introduction.
•	 Authority	of	Assembly	Codes	and	Ways	and	Means	committee	chairs	to	request	bills	outside	their	
logical jurisdiction as a means of preventing full consideration.
•	 Lack	of	successful	discharge	motions	in	either	chamber.
•	 Off-the-record	canvass	by	agreement	votes	on	discharge	motions	in	the	Senate.
•	 Lack	of	dissent	on	the	floor	in	either	chamber.
•	 Senate	committee	chairs	requesting	and	recommitting	bills	passed	in	the	first	year	of	the	term	to	
the committee of original jurisdiction at the beginning of the second year.
As a remedy to these problems, we propose the following reforms:
•	 Members	should	have	the	right	to	have	all	bills	drafted	within	a	reasonable	period	of	time.
•	 Bill	numbers	must	be	provided	within	48	hours	of	the	bill’s	filing	with	the	Clerk	of	each	house.	
•	 Explicitly	prohibit	any	committee	from	requesting	bills	outside	their	jurisdiction.
•	 Motions	to	discharge	should	be	allowed	after	20	days	following	a	bill’s	introduction	or	within	
two committee meetings.
•	 Bills	may	be	discharged	from	committee	and	placed	on	the	calendar	by	a	motion	approved	by	a	
simple majority of members on the floor.
•	 All	votes—motions	to	discharge,	canvasses	of	agreement,	or	otherwise—should	be	recorded	and	
made public on each chamber’s Web site.
•	 The	rules	of	both	chambers	should	clearly	state	that	only	the	introducer	of	a	bill	can	request	that	a	
bill be recommitted to committee after it has passed the full chamber in the first term of a session. 
This request can be granted only by majority vote of the chamber.
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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND INDICATORS OF LEADERSHIP CONTROL
problem: Leadership Control Over the Administration of Bill Introduction
The uphill climb to get legislation to the floor begins even before bill introduction. The Legislative leadership 
controls the staff charged with drafting legislation, and one member of the Assembly majority reports that 
when he has sought to introduce legislation drafting staff has replied, “We have to ask [Assembly Speaker 
Sheldon Silver] if we can draft it.”45 Even after a legislator receives the necessary “permission” to get legislation 
drafted, the bill must get an “assigned number,” which “can take five minutes or a month an a half ” depend-
ing on the leadership’s preference.46 In the Senate, committee chairs have more control over their own staff, 
though the leadership maintains control in other ways.
solutions:
Members will have the right to have all bills drafted within a reasonable period of time.
Bill numbers must be provided within 48 hours of the bill’s filing with the Clerk of each house. 
problem: Authority of Assembly Chairs of Ways and Means and Codes to Request Bills Outside  
       Their Jurisdiction
The Assembly rules allow the chair of the chamber’s Ways and Means committee to request bills outside the 
committee’s jurisdiction with the approval of the Speaker. While the rules do not expressly grant this same 
authority to the Codes committee, the committee engages in this practice as well, presenting procedural 
roadblocks to the passage of legislation outside of the committee’s jurisdiction. 
For example, a bill to create a standing Conference Committee to resolve differences between similar bills has 
been introduced year after year. Assemblywoman Sandy Galef sponsored the latest version47 and introduced 
the bill in Governmental Operations in the past two years. In June of 2008, the bill was referred to Ways and 
Means two days before the end of the session, despite its lack of fiscal implications. Similarly, a bill intro-
duced by Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn that changed written consent for an HIV test to oral consent, 
in part to remove bureaucratic barriers, was referred to Codes a week before the end of session despite its lack 
of sanction or penalty.48 These unnecessary roadblocks are another means of Leadership control.
solution:
Explicitly prohibit any committee from requesting bills outside their jurisdiction.
problem: No Successful Discharge Motions
As was the case in 2005 and 2006, not a single discharge motion successfully moved a bill from committee 
to a floor vote in either chamber in 2006, 2007 or 2008.49 Discharge motions are subject to stringent time 
restrictions that the chair holds the sole power to waive. Thus, it remains impossible to receive full consider-
ation over the objection of the leadership even if enough support exists to pass a bill. 
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solutions:
Motions to discharge should be allowed after 20 days following a bill’s introduction or within two committee meetings.
Senate rules should be amended to allow bills to be discharged from committee and placed on the calendar 
by a motion approved by the majority members on the floor. 
problem: Vote by Canvass of Agreement
In the Senate, but not the Assembly, motions to discharge bills from committees are subject to floor votes 
known as a canvass of agreement. (This is also the case with amendments to bills on the floor.) During 
canvass of agreement votes, the record only notes the “yes” votes; the record does not reflect nor distinguish 
between those who voted “no,” those who abstained, and those who were absent. These votes, which rarely if 
ever pass, protect members from going on record as failing to discharge a bill.
solution:
All votes—motions to discharge, canvasses of agreement, or otherwise—should be fully recorded and made 
public on each chamber’s Web site.
problem: Lack of Dissent on Full Consideration
The lack of dissent on the floor is yet another sign of control by the leadership, who will not bring contro-
versial measures to the floor if they think they will be defeated. Between 1997 and 2001 in the Senate and 
1997 and 1999 in the Assembly, the periods covered in the 2004 Report, neither chamber voted down a single 
bill. The tradition of leadership control continued in 2005 when the Assembly voted on 1,649 bills and the 
Senate on 1,650, with none defeated. In 2006, the Assembly considered 2,063 bills and the Senate consid-
ered more than 2,100 bills, again without a single bill defeated. The Senate considered 1,867 bills in 2007, 
again without a single defeat. As of this printing, Assembly has not yet posted its 2007 Journal on the New 
York State Library Digital Archives, so it is difficult to discern the precise number of bills considered by that 
chamber in 2007.
Not only do all bills brought to the floor eventually pass, but very few bills meet any meaningful dissent.  Of 
the	317	major	bills	passed	in	2005,	only	44	in	the	Senate	(i.e.,	13.9%)	and	89	in	the	Assembly	(i.e.,	28.1%)	
received any “no” votes.
In	2006,	only	36	of	191	major	bills	(i.e.,	15.2%)	received	any	“no”	votes	in	the	Senate,	and	44	of	the	same	
191	bills	(i.e.,	23%)	received	any	“no”	votes	in	the	Assembly.	In	that	same	year,	only	3	major	bills	(i.e.,	1.5%)	
were	opposed	by	at	least	10%	of	the	Senate	membership	and	7	(i.e.,	3.7%)	were	opposed	by	at	least	10%	
of	the	Assembly	membership.	In	2007,	only	24	of	205	major	bills	(i.e.,	11.7%)	received	any	“no”	votes	in	
the	Senate,	and	only	66	major	bills	(i.e.,	31.7%)	received	any	“no”	votes	in	the	Assembly.	Only	4	major	bills	
(i.e.,	1.9%)	were	opposed	by	at	least	10%	of	the	Senate	membership,	and	21	major	bills	(i.e.,	10.2%)	were	
opposed	by	at	least	10%	of	the	Assembly	membership.
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solution:
No one rule can solve the problem of lack of dissent on the floor. However, the leadership loosens its strangle-
hold on the legislative process and rank-and-file members gain the power to move bills to the floor by major-
ity vote, a greater number of contentious bills are likely to arrive on the floor, resulting in more rigorous and 
robust debate. 
problem: Requesting Bills in Second Year of Term Passed in First Year
Under the rules of both chambers, bills passed in one house in the first term of a legislative session revert 
either to the third reading calendar (for a vote), or, upon the request of the committee chair, to the committee 
of original jurisdiction, at the beginning of the second session. There appears to be no justification for this, 
and	it	leads	to	inefficient	repetition	of	efforts	on	the	floor	or	in	committees.	In	January	2006,	nearly	83%	
of the 203 bills on the Assembly agenda were passed in 2005.50	During	January	2008,	90%	of	the	581	bills	
on	the	Assembly	agenda	were	passed	in	2007.		In	the	Senate,	58%	of	the	60	bills	on	the	January	calendar	in	
2008 were passed the previous year.51
Assemblywoman Sandy Galef and Senator John Bonacic have introduced legislation calling for continual 
two-year session, which would streamline the process of bill introduction and prevent re-passing in the sec-
ond year.  Assemblywoman Galef ’s bill, which has 80 combined sponsors—enough to pass on the floor—was 
referred from the Governmental Operations committee where it remains.52 (Senator Bonacic introduced the 
bill to the Investigations and Government Operations Committee.53) 
solution:
The rules of both chambers should clearly state that only the introducer of a bill can request that a bill be 
recommitted to committee after it has passed the full chamber in the first term of a session. This request can 
be granted only by majority vote of the chamber.
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iv. insufficient debate, lack of amendments, inadequate review
The lack of public discussion or debate in committee or on the floor is a debilitating weakness of New York’s 
Legislative process. The legislature rarely engages is any deliberation, either by holding hearings on legislation 
or through public debate.
The few hearings and little public debate that exist in Albany virtually disappear during the end-of-session 
rush of bills reported out of committee. A majority of bills are passed in both houses in the final month of 
session, with a significant proportion passed in the last days before recess. 
Most of the following ways in which consideration by the full chamber is limited are problems discussed in 
our previous reports:
•	 Senate	records	indicate	that	the	joint	rule	requiring	fiscal	notes	to	be	attached	to	all	relevant	leg-
islation isn’t widely followed, and when it is, the fiscal analysis is sometimes done irresponsibly.  
•	 The	full	chambers	rarely	or	never	vote	on	or	debate	amendments	to	legislation.
•	 Both	houses	place	serious	constraints	on	floor	debate.54 
•	 “Messages	of	necessity”	are	not	used	for	their	intended	purpose	of	expediting	the	legislative	pro-
cess in case of emergency, but rather to circumvent the Constitution’s three-day aging period for bills.
•	 The	vast	majority	of	legislation	continues	to	come	to	the	floor	of	both	chambers	within	the	final	
30 days of the session, leaving no opportunity for meaningful deliberation and debate.
As a remedy to these problems, we propose the following reforms:
•	 Any	member	should	have	the	ability	to	object	to	the	consideration	of	a	bill	with	fiscal	implica-
tions on the grounds that it lacks a substantial and sufficient fiscal note.
•	 Actuaries	who	prepare	fiscal	notes	must	attest	to	no	conflict	of	interest.
•	 All	amendments	to	bills	under	consideration	by	the	full	chamber	must	be	subject	to	a	vote,	and	
all “aye” and “nay” votes will be recorded and made public.
•	 Adopt	a	formal	rule	stating	that	no	messages	of	necessity	will	be	approved	by	the	Governor	unless	a)	
at least two-thirds of the members of the chamber in question have voted to request that message, and 
b) the governor has personally reviewed and signed each message as intended by the Constitution.
•	 All	bills	must	receive	consideration	by	the	full	chamber	within	30	days	after	being	voted
out of committee.
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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEBATE, AMENDMENTS, AND 
LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
problem: Few Fiscal Notes on Major Legislation
The Senate Rules mandate that, “The Finance Committee shall keep and maintain a file containing all bills 
requiring fiscal notes and the notes appertaining thereto, which shall be available to Senators and officers of 
the Senate, accredited representatives of the press, and other responsible persons having a legitimate interest 
therein.” 55 However, no fiscal notes from 2006 are on file with the Finance Committee.56 A fair number 
of fiscal notes from 2007 are on file, though only 3 pertain to major legislation, far fewer than the number 
major bills with potential fiscal impact.
Substantive fiscal notes are missing from some bills with clear fiscal impact. For example, the 2010 Campaign 
Reform Act, which passed the Assembly with Speaker Silver and its primary sponsor, was an important bill 
concerning public financing of state campaigns, a concept that several reform groups including the Brennan 
Center support. The bill’s statement of fiscal impact began: “Their [sic] will be no cost in 2008 or 2009. 
In 2010, there will be costs associated with participating candidates seeking election to the office of state 
comptroller,”57 and ended with an unacceptable admission: “The long term cost of the system in New York 
is unknown.”58 The joint rules of the Senate and Assembly currently state that, “No bill requiring a fiscal 
impact note shall be reported to the floor of the house unless accompanied by the appropriate note […],”59 
but legislators clearly fail to follow this rule consistently.
Perhaps worse, In May of this year, the New York Times reported that an actuary on the payroll of a public 
employees union was providing fiscal analysis for how various bills would affect public employee pensions. 
In one case, the actuary claimed that a bill that dealt with early retirement would have no cost to the state. 
He later recanted the no-cost estimate admitting he got carried away and calling his estimates “a step above 
voodoo.”60 A few weeks later, the Times reported that according to the independent actuary of the city pen-
sion system, the 11 bills vetted by this actuary that have become law since 2000 will result in $500 million 
in eventual costs.61 
solutions:
Any member will have the ability to object to the consideration of a bill with fiscal implications on the 
grounds that it lacks a substantial and sufficient fiscal note.
Actuaries must attest to no conflict of interest before preparing a fiscal note.
problem: The Full Chamber Rarely Votes to Amend Bills
Amendments to bills on the floor provide an opportunity for rank-and-file legislators to give input on policy 
outside the jurisdiction of the committees in which they participate. In 2006 and 2007, however, amend-
ments were almost never voter on or debated in committee.
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In 2006, the Senate and the Assembly each voted on only one amendment to major legislation, and only the 
Senate debated the amendment on which it held a full vote. In 2007, the full Senate did not vote on a single 
amendment to major legislation, and the Assembly voted on only six amendments to major legislation, hold-
ing debate on only one of those amendments.
While	the	membership	of	the	Senate	voted	on	amendments	concerning	to	0.5%	and	0%	of	to	major	legisla-
tion in 2006 and 2007, respectively, Senate bill sponsors amended nearly a fifth of all major legislation after 
passage	out	of	committee.	In	the	Senate,	the	sponsors	of	major	legislation	amended	21.5%	of	their	own	ma-
jor	bills	in	2006	and	19.9%	of	their	own	major	bills	in	2007	on	the	third	reading.	None	of	these	amendments	
received a debate or a vote by the full chamber; the Senate rules explicitly waive debate or a vote on sponsor 
amendments62 and the Assembly considers these Amendments to be housekeeping.63 In the Assembly, spon-
sors	amended	5.2%	of	their	own	major	bills	on	the	third	reading	in	2006	and	1.5%	of	their	own	major	bills	
on the third reading in 2007.
solution:
While the rules of neither chamber explicitly prohibit amendments from members other than the bill spon-
sor, it is clear that leadership control over the legislative process has a stifling effect on non-sponsor amend-
ments. If the leadership loosens its grip on the process, it is likely that more frequent amendments and debate 
thereon would be a part of a more robust deliberative culture in Albany.
All amendments to bills under consideration by the full chamber must be subject to a vote, and all “aye” and 
“nay” votes will be recorded and made public.
problem: Rare Debate
Floor	debate	has	become	even	rarer	since	the	2006	report.	In	2006,	97.4%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Senate	
and	96.5%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Assembly	without	substantive	debate;	89.5%	of	major	bills	passed	the	
Senate	and	86.3%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Assembly	without any discussion at all. In 2007, the frequency 
of	debate	improved	slightly	in	the	Assembly,	but	remained	almost	exactly	the	same	in	the	Senate:	97.1%	of	
major	bills	passed	the	Senate	and	88.3%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Assembly	without	any	substantive	debate;	
89.2%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Senate	and	77.6%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Assembly	with	no	discussion	at	all.
solution:
No one rule will remedy this problem. Once again, however, if the rules allow bills to come to the floor over 
the objections of leadership, more voices will be added to the legislative discourse and more public debate is likely.
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case study ii: brownfield cleanup program and the $3 billion tab
In our 2004 report, we described the failure of Albany to address the cleanup of environmentally contami-
nated abandoned industrial properties, so-called “brownfields,” as “one of the most blatant examples of Al-
bany dysfunction.”64 In June 2003, the “three men in a room”—Governor Pataki, Assembly Speaker Silver 
and Senate Majority Leader Bruno negotiated a bill behind closed doors and speedily ushered it through the 
Assembly without debate using a message of necessity, depriving members of any opportunity to review its 
complex provisions.65 In its end-of-session haste, the Senate passed the wrong version of the bill. The Senate 
convened three months later for a special one-day session to correct their error.66 The 2004 Report noted, 
“One can only imagine the errors that such inadequate review is likely to produce in laws that have a lower 
public profile than the brownfields legislation.”67 
It turns out that New York’s law included serious flaws. The fiscal note, which is required by Assembly and 
Senate Rules, stated that an estimated $120 million in annually available bonds would fund the program.68 
Today, the state is facing a possible $3.1 billion tab for the current slate of projects under the state’s Brown-
fields Program.69  According to several news reports, real estate developers are reaping tax benefits that exceed 
the cost of redeveloping the brownfields.70
 
The developer boondoggle was uncovered by Comptroller Tom DiNapoli—not by any of the relevant stand-
ing committees in the Legislature—who released a report in June 2008 concluding that the tax credits under 
the 2003 law could potentially amount to billions of dollars for 200 projects, far more expensive than neigh-
boring states with similar legislation. 
The shortcomings of the original legislation forced the Legislature to revisit the cleanup program, passing 
the Brownfields Cleanup Program 2008, which capped redevelopment credits for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing projects at $45 million and $35 million respectively.71 To put the need for the legislative fix 
in perspective, a mall under construction in Syracuse could cost the state more than $1 billion alone under 
the 2003 law.72  
The fiscal note attached to the 2008 law indicated savings in future years without providing an estimate.73 
Given that the cost of the original legislation far exceeded the $120 million budgeted, it would have been 
wise to include a realistic accounting of the potential savings. 
Two hearings on the most recent brownfields legislation took place in August and September of 2007, held 
jointly by the Senate and Assembly Committees on Environmental Conservation. At the first hearing, Pete 
Grannis, Commissioner of the State Department of Environmental Conservation, sounded the alarm about 
potential costs. “The current tax credits awarded to brownfields cleanup and development projects are simply 
too generous and insufficiently targeted resulting in the misdirection of hundreds of millions of dollar of state 
funds that could be used to stimulate better cleanups and more development.”74  At least three committees 
in each chamber have potential oversight over brownfields legislation. Despite the Commissioner’s warning, 
the program’s cost was not discovered until the Comptroller released his report.
Ultimately, the revised brownfields legislation was introduced, passed though committee, and approved by 
the full chambers of the Assembly and Senate in a single day after the scheduled end of session using a “mes-
sage of necessity.”75 Lawmakers negotiated the legislation behind closed doors and discussed it in the privacy 
of the Assembly Democratic Conference over several days.76 
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moderate improvements: Messages of Necessity
The number of messages of necessity in 2006 rose slightly from the 2005 numbers 
indicated in our previous report, and then dropped in 2007, with a decline in 
the number of messages of necessity used in both houses and the most dramatic 
decrease in the Senate. This drop is reportedly due to increased tensions between 
the Senate and the executive branch in the last two years, rather than a reformed 
legislative process.77
solution:
While the overuse of messages of necessity was apparently alleviated by the dete-
rioration in relations between the former Governor and legislature, we nevertheless 
continue to recommend adopting a formal rule stating that no messages of neces-
sity will be approved by the Governor unless a) at least two-thirds of the members 
of the chamber in question have voted to request that message, and b) the governor 
has personally reviewed and signed each message as intended by the Constitution.
problem: End of Session Logjam
The frenzy to pass bills in the final days of session remains problematic, even though 
the	statistics	have	fluctuated	somewhat	in	recent	years.	In	2005,	36%	of	all	major	
legislation	passed	the	Senate	and	40.4%	of	major	legislation	passed	the	Assembly	
in the final three days of the legislative session.78 These numbers represented an 
increase	from	the	five	year	period	between	1997	and	2001	when	21.4%	of	major	
bills	passed	the	Senate	and	24%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Assembly	during	the	final	
three	days	of	session.	In	2006,	32%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Senate	and	36%	of	
major bills passed the Assembly in the final 3 days before recess. In the final 30 days 
of	the	2006	session,	a	full	74%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Senate	and	62%	of	major	
bills	passed	the	Assembly.	In	2007,	31%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Senate	and	a	new	
high	of	45%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Assembly	in	the	final	3	days	before	recess.	
In	the	final	30	days	of	the	2007	session,	71%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Senate	and	
76%	of	major	bills	passed	the	Assembly.
solution:
All bills must receive consideration by the full chamber within 30 days after being 
voted out of committee.
1997               7   6
1998              19  16
1999              17  10
2000              29  24
2001              11   5
2005              14  10
2006              16  11
2007              14   6
mon
in at least 
one 
chamber
mon
in both 
chambersyear
messages of necessity
22 | Brennan Center for Justice
case study iii: coastal/auto insurance
A bill that extended homeowner insurance protection for coastal residents of New York in Queens, the Bronx 
and Long Island gained a strange bedfellow when it was combined with an allowance for auto insurance com-
panies	to	raise	or	lower	rates	up	to	5%	a	year	without	prior	approval	from	the	state	Insurance	Department.	
It is not so much the strange combination of subject matter that is problematic; the real cause for concern is 
the speed with which the bill blew through the Legislature at last possible moment. 
The time elapsed from bill introduction to passage in both houses was just seven days—at the very end of ses-
sion. The bill passed the Senate, was delivered to the Assembly, and passed the Assembly in a single day.79
The result of the bill’s short life cycle was a legislative process that didn’t allow for full deliberation or for 
input from affected parties. “At the end of the day, legislators have a responsibility to consider the full impact 
of the bills they are considering, especially how they affect consumers and members of the public, and vote 
in the public interest,” said Chuck Bell, Programs Director for Consumers Union, publisher of Consumer 
Reports.80  “The Assembly and Senate’s decision to exclude consumer organizations from the legislative pro-
cess was unfair and undemocratic, and it will likely have very negative financial impacts on working families 
in New York State.” 
The speedy passage of the auto rate deregulation, combined with the end-of-session rush, effectively elimi-
nated any meaningful discussion or review of the bill by outside groups or the public, thereby eliminating 
any negative attention about the impact of the bill.
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case study iv: legislative ethics, an oxymoron?: peera, contrasting the 
executive and legislature
The Public Employees Ethics Reform Act (PEERA) of 2007 is the only comprehensive modification to ethics 
laws in New York State in the last 20 years.  Unfortunately, the process by which lawmakers developed this 
important legislation was not robust, undermining its potential for positive impact. The veiled proceedings 
surrounding the legislation’s development caused one Assemblyman to remark, “Although this legislation is a 
good beginning, the fact that this was created behind closed doors by the Governor and Legislative Leaders of 
both houses undermines the public confidence in state government.”81 Brian Horner, Legislative Director of 
NYPIRG has reported that the 73-page bill was unveiled on January 23, 2007 and adopted by the legislature 
without hearing or substantive debate on March 26, 2007.82  
The ethics act contains several apparent flaws that a robust and public development process might have iden-
tified and eliminated. The reform closed the revolving door loophole, preventing former employees of the 
legislature from lobbying their body for two years and adding a restriction on executive chamber employees 
appearing before state agencies. However, it didn’t address the issue of former legislators lobbying state agen-
cies, the exact problem presented by ex-Majority Leader Joseph Bruno who is now a registered lobbyist for a 
company that has active state contracts. 
The most visible step taken under the new law was the creation of the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI), 
the result of merging of the Temporary Commission on Lobbying and the State Ethics Commission, which 
had jurisdiction over executive branch officials and their employees. Despite a lack of legislator interest in 
regulating ethics, the Legislative Ethics Commission—a body under the control of the legislature itself—
retained jurisdiction over legislators and their employees under PEERA.  
PEERA made only one change to the Legislative Ethics Commission, expanding its membership from eight 
to nine members: four legislators and five non-legislators. Each of the four legislative leaders appoints a 
legislator and a non-legislative member; the Speaker of the Assembly and the Senate Majority Leader jointly 
appoint the non-legislative member. The Commission remains an extension of the legislators’ own team of 
lawyers, particularly those representing the Majorities in the Assembly and Senate.83 Despite the litany of 
charges against legislators,84 Melissa Ryan, the longtime Executive Director of the State’s former Legislative 
Ethics Commission admitted, “We’ve never issued a notice of probable cause. I don’t think we’ve ever as-
sessed a penalty.”85
The failure of  PEERA’s development is borne out in the ineffectiveness of the Legislative Ethics Commission 
to regulate the actions of the members within its jurisdiction. In 2008 alone, four members of the Assembly 
have been on the wrong side of corruption. One was convicted and sentenced to two to six years for receiv-
ing bribes; another may be sentenced to a maximum of 10 years after pleading guilty to racketeering and 
perjury; a third faces an upcoming federal trial on charges of fraud; and the last was just accused of receiving 
$500,000 for his official duties.86 
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v. legislative ineffiCienCy, unfair distribution of funds, 
infreQuent ConferenCe Committees
The New York State Legislature broke a record in 2008 year by introducing more than 18,000 bills—while 
just 1,634, or 9%, passed both chambers.87 The excess bill introduction is a waste of resources and highly inef-
ficient.  By way of comparison, members of the United States Congress introduced fewer than 11,000 bills 
and resolutions in the same year. In other state legislatures, the next-highest bill introduction rate was in the 
New Jersey legislature, with only one-third the number of bills introduced in New York.
After introduction, bills sometimes languish due to a lack of political will or resources to usher them through 
the legislative process. Compounding the lack of efficiency is the unequal distribution of resources be-
tween senior and junior members of each party and between the Majority and Minority in both chambers. 
The key problems related to legislative inefficiency are:
•	 Infrequent	conference	committees.
•	 An	extraordinarily	high	number	of	bills	introduced	in	both	chambers.
•	 Unfair	distribution	of	funds	both	between	the	majority	and	the	minority	and	between	junior	and	
senior members of the legislature.
•	 Lack	of	transparency	in	legislative	spending.
As a remedy to these problems, we propose the following reforms:
•	 When	bills	addressing	similar	subject	matter	pass	both	houses,	a	conference	committee	should	
be convened by request of primary sponsor or chair of committee of original jurisdiction or 
leader in both chambers. The Conference Committee will consist of members from each party 
proportionate to the parties’ representation in each chamber, and no less than one member of the 
minority party from each chamber.  
•	 Each	member	should	be	limited	to	introducing	20	bills	in	the	Assembly	and	30	bills	in	the	Senate	
in each session.
•	 All	members	 should	 receive	equal	 funding	 for	operating	costs	 and	 staff	budgets,	 regardless	of	
party or seniority.
•	 As	with	the	other	products	of	the	lawmaking	process,	the	Legislature	should	publish	their	expen-
ditures on the Internet semi-annually. 
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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE EFFICIENCY, DISTRIBUTION OF 
FUNDS, AND CONFERENCE COMMITTEES
problem: Infrequent Conference Committees
The power to convene conference committees to reconcile similar legislation passed in both houses remains 
vested in the Leaders of each chamber according to a joint rule. No mechanism exists for bill sponsors or even 
committee chairs to resolve differences between bills passed by both of the chambers without the assent of 
the Assembly Speaker and Senate Majority Leader. To resolve differences, houses usually substitute a version 
of a bill passed in one chamber for their own, thereby circumventing input of legislators. 
solution:
When bills addressing similar subject matter pass both houses, a conference committee should be convened 
by request of primary sponsor or chair of committee of original jurisdiction or leader in both chambers. The 
Conference Committee will consist of members from each party proportionate to the parties’ representation 
in each chamber, and no less than one member of the minority party from each chamber.  
problem: Ratio of Bills Introduced to Bills Enacted
The relatively high number of bills introduced in the Legislature has increased over time and continues to 
outpace	other	 states.	 In	2006,	 the	number	of	bills	 introduced,	17,700,	 jumped	17.7%	in	one	year.88  In 
2008,	18,239	bills	were	introduced,	yet	only	1,634	(i.e.,	9%),	passed	both	houses.	That’s	slightly	better	than	
the	8.2%	of	bills	passed	in	2005,	but	it	represents	a	20.1%	increase	in	the	number	of	bills	introduced	over	
3 just years. 
To put these figures in perspective, according to 2006 statistics, the state with the second highest number of 
bills introduced was New Jersey with 6,430, and California’s legislature, representing nearly twice the popula-
tion of New York, introduced fewer than 2,000 bills.89  
solution:
Each member should be limited to introducing 20 bills in the Assembly and 30 bills in the Senate in each session
problem: Unfair Distribution of Funds for Minority
The Leaders of both houses control the purse strings for members’ budgets. From October 1, 2005 through 
March 31, 2006 the average budget for a member of the Senate Majority was $361,142, compared to 
$197,391	for	a	member	of	the	Senate	Minority—an	82%	difference.90 In the Assembly, the average budget 
was	$161,576	for	members	of	the	Majority	and	$109,805	for	the	Minority,	a	disparity	of	47%.91 
For	the	same	October	to	March	period	in	2008,	the	resource	gap	in	the	Senate	narrowed	to	62%,	with	aver-
age budgets of $445,904 for members of the Senate Majority and $274,316 for members of the Minority.92 
In	the	Assembly,	the	resource	disparity	decreased	to	33%,	with	an	$181,078	average	budget	for	members	of	
the Majority and a $135,982 average budget for members of the Minority.93  Even though the divide between 
staff budgets is narrowing, the difference in resource allocation remains high considering that all members of 
the Assembly and Senate, whether in the majority or minority, represent the same number of constituents.  
A reasonable model for distribution of funds between the Majority and Minority is the U.S. Congress. The 
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two houses have slightly different ways of disturbing the budget to members, but the bottom line is that all 
get an equal amount, regardless of party membership. In the House, each member receives an allowance to 
hire up to 18 full-time staff and 4 part-time staff. Furthermore, each member receives an allowance for office 
space expenses based on the rate charged by the General Services Administration. The U.S. Senate provides a 
lump sum, equal for all members, allowing flexibility in how their staffing and budget is allocated. The Senate 
also allows for varying real estate costs through a calculation tied to state population. 
solution:
All members should receive equal funding for operating costs and staff budgets, regardless of party or seniority.
problem: Disparity of Staff Funds in the Assembly Majority
Control of funds for members’ staff and operating expenses, yet another means of leadership control, is most 
stark in the Assembly Majority, where the most senior member receives $500,000 for staffing their district 
and Albany offices, and the most junior member receives only $100,000. The staffing budget of a junior 
member usually allows for only two full-time employees. At the other end of the spectrum, the most senior 
members can fund upwards of 10 full-time employees. While it’s true that many senior members of the 
Assembly are chairs of committees, but committee staff budgets are separate and additional to the member 
budget.
Assemblyman Richard Gottfried has the most expensive office budget in the Assembly.94 At one count this 
year, he had a staff of 10, six located in his Manhattan office and four in Albany.95 (This does not include staff 
of the Health Committee, which he chairs.) On the other end of the spectrum, the average freshman or rela-
tively new member of the Assembly can afford no more than two full-time employees, usually supplemented 
by at least one part-time staff member.
With far fewer resources, newer members of the Assembly tend to keep staff in their district offices to serve 
their communities. As a result, the policy-making responsibilities of new members receive less attention. This 
is not to say that new members don’t devote resources to developing policy, but rather that they are put in 
the unenviable dilemma of deciding between policymaking and constituent services.             
solution:
All members should receive equal funding for operating costs and staff budgets, regardless of party or seniority.
problem: Legislative Spending Isn’t Transparent
The Legislature’s office and staff expenditure reports are published semi-annually, but aren’t made readily available to 
the public. The reports are only available to the general public through Freedom of Information Law request. Thanks 
to the work of the Empire Center for New York State Policy, state expenditures, the state payroll, and member items, 
i.e., pork barrel projects are available through the web site www.SeeThroughNY.net. While this has added transpar-
ency, state government should not rely on private groups to lift the veil of secrecy—it should do so itself.
solution:
As with the other products of the lawmaking process, the Legislature should publish their expenditures on 
the Internet semi-annually. 
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vi. conclusions and summary of proposed rules reform
It has become vogue to attach the phrase “most dysfunctional” to any discussion about the state Legislature. 
The results of the 2004 and 2006 Reports, the latter of which followed a narrow and failed attempt to reform 
the process, detail the acute absence of the hallmarks of a robust legislative body: accessibility, accountability, 
deliberativeness and representativeness. While the sad tradition is longstanding, a major fix would be easy: 
change the internal operating rules to end leadership control and open up the process.
In January of 2009, we urge the Legislature to heed the call of the people for change by implementing the 
following reforms at minimum: 
•	 Strengthen	standing	committees	by	giving	members	authority	to	convene	meetings	and	by	re-
quiring committee members to be present to vote.
•	 End	the	leadership	stranglehold	on	bills	coming	to	the	floor	by	allowing	rank-and-file	members	
to discharge bills from committee and place them on the floor calendar by majority vote.
•	 Allow	adequate	opportunity	for	consideration	of	 legislation	by	requiring	adequate	fiscal	analysis	
and allowing ample time for full consideration of each bill on the floor before the close of session.
•	 Provide	sufficient	opportunity	and	resources	for	full	consideration	of	legislation	by	making	use	of	
robust conference committees and distributing member funds equally.
•	 Make	all	records	and	products	of	the	legislative	process	fully	transparent	and	easily	accessible	to	
the public through the Internet.
For a complete list of specific rules recommendations, see Appendix A in the back of this report.
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methodology
Data Set. The research for this report primarily focuses on the sets of laws passed in 2006 and 2007 that were 
identified by McKinney’s Session Laws of New York as “major legislation.” See McKinney’s Session Laws of New 
York, III – XXVIII (2006); McKinney’s Session Laws of New York, III – XXVII (2007). For a list of these laws, 
see Appendix B.Bill Introduction, Intra-Chamber Passage, and Enactment. The Legislative Digest reports the 
number of bills introduced by each chamber in 2006 (7,284 in the Senate and 10,416 in the Assembly) and 
2007 (6,537 in the Senate and 9,535 in the Assembly). To calculate the number of these bills passed by each 
chamber, the authors used the record of roll call votes in the Senate and Assembly journals for 2006 and 2007. 
See Journal of the Assembly of the State of New York, v2, 2302-2883 (2006); Journal of the Senate of the State 
of New York, v2, 2357-2716 (2006); Journal of the Senate of the State of New York, Senate Voting Record, 
v2, 1-486 (2007). The number of bills enacted into law was calculated as the number of bills that were passed 
by both chambers and signed by the Governor plus the number of bills that were approved by two-thirds 
of both chambers after initially being passed by both chambers and vetoed by the Governor. The num ber of 
bills passed by a single chamber (i.e., the Assembly or Senate) includes the number of bills enacted into law and 
the number of bills passed only by the chamber in question. See Legislative Bill Drafting Commission, State of 
New York Legislative Digest, at iii (2006); Legislative Bill Drafting Commission, State of New York Legislative 
Digest, at iii (2007).
Frequency oF committee meetingS. The authors obtained vote and attendance records for committee 
meetings at which votes on major legislation took place, and calculated the number of meetings for each 
committee by examining the dates on the attendance records. For a broader picture of committee meetings 
(including those during which no major legislation was discussed), we conducted interviews with legislators, 
their staff and legislative counsel in both chambers to determine whether scheduled meetings occurred and 
how they were attended.
committee HearingS. Neither chamber keeps detailed, publicly available records of hearings held by com-
mittees. Because standing committees only hold hearings on broad issues and not concerning major legisla-
tion, this report only included a thorough investigation of the activities of the Ethics and Oversight commit-
tees in each chamber. Interviews provided information about hearings held by these committees and about 
the general culture of unspecific standing committee hearings in Albany.
committee VoteS. To determine the amount of opposition faced by each of our major pieces of legislation 
in committee, the authors examined committee vote records provided by the Assembly Public Information 
Office and the Office of the Secretary of the Senate.
committee reportS. The FOIL requests made of both chambers included a request for any committee re-
ports. Neither office sent committee reports in response to our initial request, though a follow-up request did 
yield committee reports on most major legislation from the Office of the Secretary of the Senate, while the 
Assembly Public Information Office confirmed that no such reports exist for meetings in that chamber.
Floor Debate. Information on debate was collected from the floor transcripts pro vided by the Senate Journal 
Clerk’s Office and the Assembly Public Information Office. The distinction between substantive debate and 
grandstanding—such as the explanation of a member’s vote after the passage of the bill—was determined 
based on whether a question was asked by a member before the vote.
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amenDmentS. The rules of both the Senate and Assembly stipulate that the num ber of amendments be in-
dicated with a letter at the end of the bill number (i.e., A1234A has been amended once, S5678B has been 
amended twice, etc.). The final printed bill number of each major law thus indicates if it has been amend ed 
and how many times. The authors used the State of New York Legislative Digest, compiled by the Legislative 
Bill Drafting Commission, to determine whether the bill was amended in committee or on a third reading. 
The authors also used the floor debate transcripts received from the Senate Journal Clerk’s Office and the 
Assembly Public Information Office to determine if any of the amendments were debated on and agreed to 
by the full chamber.
FiScal noteS. The authors sent a FOIL request to the Office of the Secretary of the Senate requesting the 
list of bills requiring fiscal notes and the notes appended thereto for 2006 and 2007. The Secretary of the 
Finance Committee provided copies of all fiscal notes on file for this period, which we compared with the list 
of major legislation to determine how many major bills were accompanied by a fiscal note. The Secretary of 
the Senate twice confirmed that there were no fiscal notes on file for 2006.
meSSageS oF neceSSity. The Legislative Digest contains notation indicating whether a message of necessity 
was associated with a bill. The authors used this resource to compile statistics on the frequency of its use.
Floor VoteS. To determine the amount of opposition to bills on the floor of each chamber, the authors used 
voting records for each bill obtained from the Assembly Public Information Office and the Office of the 
Secretary of the Senate.
timing oF paSSage. To determine the percentage of bills passed in the final three days and the final thirty days 
of the session, we used the bill history provided in the Legislative Digest for each piece of major legislation. 
Bills passed in extraordinary session are included in these totals. 
legiSlatiVe expenDitureS. Legislative Expenditures were compiled using the Empire Center for New York 
State Policy’s See through NY database, which compiles member personnel, travel, and operations expenses 
for the three six-month periods between October 1, 2006 and March 31, 2008. 
interViewS witH legiSlatorS anD StaFF. As noted throughout the report, the data obtained through Free-
dom of Information requests were at times incomplete or insufficient; moreover, many records that would 
shed crucial light on the legislative process are simply not produced by either chamber. As a complement to 
the empirical data that were available, the authors sought additional evidence from more than a dozen leg-
islators and staff to determine how the rules are enacted day-to-day, and what the records provided through 
FOIL requests truly reflect. Interviewees were given the option of remaining anonymous in this document, 
both to encourage candid responses and to protect legislators and staff from negative consequences. Ac-
cordingly, citations to interviews with individuals who opted to remain anonymous have been coded with 
alphabetical identifiers in the footnotes.
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aPPendiX a: ComPlete list of rules reCommendations
Strengthen standing committees
Standing committee chairs should have exclusive authority and responsibility to hire and fire their staff and •	
control committee budgets. 
At least one-fourth of the membership of a committee should be able to vote to convene a meeting.•	
One fourth of the members of a committee should be able to petition for a hearing on a bill or an oversight •	
hearing, and such hearing should be held unless rejected by a majority vote of the committee. All “yes,” 
“no,” “abstain,” or “absent” votes should be recorded and made available to the public. 
Each committee and sub-committee must hold an oversight hearing on at least one program or state •	
agency within its jurisdiction at least once per year.
No member’s vote on any matter before committee should be counted unless the member is physically •	
present to cast her vote.
All bills reported to the floor in both chambers must be accompanied by a substantive committee report •	
showing the committee’s work on the bill
Each committee and subcommittee in both houses should submit an annual end-of-term report to the •	
Speaker in the Assembly and Majority Leader in the Senate, detailing the work of the committee, as the 
Assembly rules currently require.
All attendance records, meeting agendas, committee votes, and minutes of committee meetings should be •	
recorded and made available to the public on the Internet at least once a month.
End the leadership stranglehold on bills coming to the floor  
Members should have the right to have all bills drafted within a reasonable period of time.•	
Bill numbers must be provided within 48 hours of the bill’s filing with the Clerk of each house. •	
Explicitly prohibit any committee from requesting bills outside their jurisdiction.•	
Motions to discharge should be allowed after 20 days following a bill’s introduction or within two •	
committee meetings.
Bills may be discharged from committee and placed on the calendar by a motion approved by a simple •	
majority of members on the floor.
All votes—motions to discharge, canvasses of agreement, or otherwise—should be recorded and made •	
public on each chamber’s Web site.
The rules of both chambers should clearly state that only the introducer of a bill can request that a bill be •	
recommitted to committee after it has passed the full chamber in the first term of a session. This request 
can be granted only by majority vote of the chamber.
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Allow ample opportunity for opportunities for legislative review, debate, and amendments
Any member should have the ability to object to the consideration of a bill with fiscal implications on the •	
grounds that it lacks a substantial and sufficient fiscal note.
Actuaries who prepare fiscal notes must attest to no conflict of interest.•	
All amendments to bills under consideration by the full chamber must be subject to a vote, and all “aye” •	
and “nay” votes should be recorded and made public.
Adopt a formal rule stating that no messages of necessity should be approved by the Governor unless a) at •	
least two-thirds of the members of the chamber in question have voted to request that message, and b) the 
governor has personally reviewed and signed each message as intended by the Constitution.
All bills must receive consideration by the full chamber within 30 days after being voted out of committee.•	
Provide all members with sufficient resources and opportunities to fully consider legislation 
When bills addressing similar subject matter pass both houses, a conference committee should be convened •	
by request of primary sponsor or chair of committee of original jurisdiction or leader in both chambers. 
The Conference Committee should consist of members from each party proportionate to the parties’ 
representation in each chamber, and no less than one member of the minority party from each chamber.  
Each member should be limited to introducing 20 bills in the Assembly and 30 bills in the Senate in •	
each session.
All members should receive equal funding for operating costs and staff budgets, regardless of party or seniority.•	
As with the other products of the lawmaking process, the Legislature should publish their expenditures on •	
the Internet semi-annually. 
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aPPendiX b:  mCkinney’s maJor legislation
2006
S6409, A09472
S8446, A11951
S8441, A12012
S6007, A09081
S6300, A09461A
S6429, A09529
S6479, A09421
S6315, A09455A
S6469, A09617
Uni. S6621, A09835
S5332, A08279
S6298, A09279A
S6343, A09451
S6417, A09517A
S6829, A09853B
S6817A, A09854A
S7193A, A10569A
S6831, A10399A
S4120, A07027
S6456C, A09556B
S6457C, A09557B
S6458C, A09558B
S6459C, A09559B
S7166, A10486
S7265, A10653
S6805B, A07349D
S5370C, A08025C
S5178A, A08456B
S5917A, A08998A
S6441, A09691
S6435, A07066
S6330, A08351
S6845, A10295
S8174, A11804
S8457, A08370A
S8459, A08939A
S8471, A12045
S7008, A10539
S5816, A08925
S7849, A10548
S8340, A00216
S6508A, A09703A
S7154B, A11458B
S7840, A10470
S8289, A11869
S7847A, A11687A
S1318, A00727
S7384, A00974
S3591, A02683
S2830, A03691
S7075, A04360A
S4691A, A06763A
S5668A, A07993B
S5754B, A08652A
S7888, A08655A
S8341A, A08761B
S5759A, A08854A
S6220, A09058
S4164, A09272
S6381, A09346
S7394, A09595
S7416, A09650
S6402A, A09723A
S6871A, A09907A
S7850, A10059
S6919, A10269
S7019, A10293
S7216A, A10369A
S7233A, A10619B
S8287, A10721
S7691A, A10767A
S7365, A10863A
S7887, A11141
S5087A, A11236
S7461A, A11550A
S8430, A11585
S0043, A10673
S2319, A06486
S2633C, A05571B
S3169C, A05622B
S4744A, A10057B
S5343A, A00914A
S6277B, A09305B
S6630, A09979
S6753A, A10716A
S6887A, A10266A
S7055, A10151
S7169A, A10130A
S7181A, A11252A
S7229, A11448
S7419A, A11570
S7602, A11357
S7637, A11475
S7828A, A11450A
S8124A, A11868A
S8170, A11795 
S8217, A11870 
S8297A, A11993
S8355, A11966
S8416, A12035
S8422, A12028
S8431, A05533A
S8435, A11792A
S8450, A12015
S8348, A11944
S2069, A00271A
S3824C, A07368D
S3912A, A08464A
S4047A, A11351
S4331B, A08105B
S5392B, A11582B
S6619A, A11544B
S6703B, A10623B
S6723, A12033
S6852A, A10100A
S6884, A10208
S7011A, A11449A
S7042A, A11854 
S7175B, A10883B
S7421B, A11042B
S7526B, A11350A
S7575A, A11109A
S7615, A08418A
S7641A, A11552A
S7659A, A11725A
S7782B, A11560B
S8029, A11590
S8096, A10447
S8227B, A12021A
S8272, A11891
S8392, A11987
S8400, A10540B
S8417, A11996
S8468, A12041 
S0784B, A00699B
S5005 F, A00891F
S3246B, A01600A
S4493, A02122
S1787, A02833
S0759, A03072
S8281, A03995
S0044C, A04135C
S3410B, A04914B
S2939, A05778
S1195, A05790
S3978A, A07060A
S8419A, A07975A
S7675C, A08417B
S5728C, A08840C
S1002C, A10309A
S6623, A10384
S7941, A10621A
S8238, A10690A
S7307B, A10757B
S7718A, A10891A
S7158A, A11129A
S5749, A05771A
S8082, A11666
S8208, A11763A
S1626A, A05058A
S2501B, A08521A
S3249D, A05608D
S4502A, A05669A
S6541, A10094
S6681, A10144
S6825A, A09992A
S6909C, A10076D
S6997A, A10285A
S7001C, A10029B
S7408, A11355
S7630, A10856
S7636A, A10633A 
S7755A, A11366A
S7936, A11474
S8021, A11595
S8024, A11627
S8182A, A03390A
S8209, A11843
S8232, A11963
S8445, A11935B
S5690, A08842
S8344, A11852A
S8349, A11977A
S8467, A12042
S6964A, A09116B
S7431A, A10802A
S8515, A12121
S8518, A12120
S8054, A11731 
S8482, A12080
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S1322, A2755
S3322, A6163
S3318, A6162
S2876, A3736
S3689, A6579
S3544, A6430
S3945, A6848
S3039, A6621
S3105A, A6846A
S3536, A2407
S4020, A7370
S4044, A7080
S2492, A5658
S3908, A7373
S5734, A7950
S3167, A1839
S5755, A8129
S2106C, A4306C
S2107C, A4307C
S2108C, A4308C
S2109C, A4309C
S2110C, A4310C
S3857A, A7526A
S5951, A8694
S2120, A4151
S2626, A6130
S3253A, A6866
S3543, A7648
S3739, A7450
S4036, A7372
S4964, A7649
S1922, A3386
S5902, A8679
S3421A, A6520A
S5945, A8689
S3982A, A8097A
S5864, A8176
S6335, A9311
S6336, A9313
S6344, A5919B
S6354, A9253A
S4834A, A0316B
S1108, A1301
S4564, A3074
S0756B, A3583B
S1624A, A3626A
S4634A, A4138A
S3022, A4367
S5181B, A6112D
S2747, A6490
S4320, A7328
S4482, A7451
S4557, A7949A
S4550, A8096
S4245, A8188
S4538, A8193
S4958, A8365
S6319, A9249
S1768A, A1095A
S2682, A4186
S3333B, A6830B
S3559, A8186
S3886, A8198
S3907, A8192
S3913A, A3053A
S4066, A0618A
S4083B, A7233B
S4118B, A4484B
S4147, A8383
S4212, A8190
S4631, A7549
S5855, A8514
S6310, A9229
S6318, A9243
S2560, A0335
S2663, A0463
S0376, A2582
S6228, A3286
S0705B, A3397B
S6194, A3978
S0830B, A4111A
S3583A, A4691A
S3071A, A5984A
S4888A, A7877A
S3555A, A8971
S6252, A9124
S1239, A0581
S1602A, A3208A
S2589, A8939
S3247A, A1559A
S3584A, A6291A
S3650, A0050
S3674, A7703
S3844A, A5347A
S3950, A8052
S3974, A8101
S4021A, A8098A
S4392B, A9260
S4547, A8095
S4589, A8611
S5012A, A4332A
S5517A, A8791A
S5541A, A8835A
S5791A, A8487A
S5875A, A8356A
S6052A, A7948A
S6277, A7512A
S6332, A0256A
S6352, A8592B
S6432, A9362
S5196A, A2434A
S5670B, A4932B
S0100, A6575
S1511C, A7351B
S4518, A7676
S5790, A7873
S5996, A8273A
S0053, A0206
S0691, A0832
S0789, A8963
S1265A, A2915B
S2307A, A7785
S2326, A7051
S2462A, A6571A
S2939, A8454
S3814B, A6628B
S3986A, A8128A
S4009B, A6610B
S4073A, A4375A
S4210, A8630
S4780A, A8629
S4833A, A8839A
S4962, A8093
S4988, A9011
S5050C, A8406B
S5477, A9083
S5764, A8578
S5766A, A8161A
S5967, A8748
S6009B, A8275B
S6234, A9263
S6435, A9363
S0105A, A0224A
S0249A, A8231A
S0627, A5317
S0849A, A1693A
S1589D, A0434D
S1869, A7312
S2334, A7241
S2586A, A0577A
S3563, A8978
S4056, A8361
S4116A, A7758A
S4542A, A8854A
S5049, A4467
S5089A, A8326A
S5618A, A8794A
S5620B, A8793A
S6230, A9103A
S6241, A9205
S6357, A9256
S5596, A1060
S3154, A1353
S5521, A1462A
S0583A, A3818A
S0255A, A5036A
S5972A, A5396A
S3420A, A6247A
S6378, A7334A
S6271, A7849B
S3826, A7892
S4329, A7905
S4793A, A8456A
S4878B, A8692C
S6351, A9244
S6141A, A4408A
S6384, A9293
S6400, A9305
S4025A, A6847B
S3829, A8618
S6240, A9052
S6167A, A9086A
S3841, A9233
S2328A, A7865A
S2383, A8283
S2709, A5825
S3092, A3379A
S3529A, A2613A
S3567, A7705
S4383C, A8591A
S4697, A0583A
S5246A, A7748A
S5374A, A8451
S5579A, A8458
S5780A, A8054A
S5973B, A8486B
S6074A, A4588B
S6159A, A9191
S6356, A2713B
S3854B, A6501B
S3004B, A7410B
S6136, A9058
S6521, A9489
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